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Internationalizing US Municipal Insolvency:
A Fair, Equitable, and Efficient Way to Overcome a
Debt Overhang
Kunibert Raffer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Adam Smith recommended sovereign insolvency as "always the measure
which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the
creditor."1 Christopher G. Oechsli published a detailed proposal of how to adapt
Chapter 11, Title 11 of the US Code,2 well before August 1982, 3 the date
considered by many as the official beginning of the debt crisis. After Mexico's
default, repeated suggestions to emulate Chapter 11 for sovereign debtors met
stiff opposition, especially from International Financial Institutions ("IFls")
such as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). Their formalistic
counterargument was that Chapter 11 did not address the problem of
sovereignty. In defense, I proposed an international version of Chapter 94 in a
paper presented at a conference at Zagreb University in 1987.' In November
2001, the IMF suddenly presented its "new approach, ' 6 emulating Chapter 11
for sovereigns.
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Presently, four proposals are on the table: Collective Action Clauses
("CACs"), voluntary Codes of Good Conduct for debt renegotiation proposed
both by the Banque de France, and (less elaborated) by the Institute of
International Finance, and two models of sovereign insolvency.7 The first two
proposals and insolvency models do not preclude each other. By helping
creditors to organize, enabling them to act more quickly and efficiently, CACs
are a useful component of any insolvency. The proper functioning of fair
procedures depends on the full ability of parties to defend their legal and
economic interests. Rules such as those elaborated by the Banque de France may
help defuse crises. By contrast, the two insolvency proposals contradict each
other fundamentally.8
For details of my proposal-termed the Fair Transparent Arbitration
Process ("FTAP") by many nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs")-to
adapt Chapter 9, Title 11 of the US Code, I refer to other publications.9
Highlighting its irreconcilable differences vis- -vis the IMF's Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM"), this paper discusses five issues of specific
interest to jurists: impartial decisionmaking, the necessity to emulate Chapter 9,
human rights and debtor protection, why equal treatment of creditors is
mandatory, and an optional element to allow smoother negotiations and to
stabilize capital markets.

II. IMPARTIAL DECISIONMAKING
With good reason, any decent legal system demands an impartial and
uninterested entity to be vested with the authority to make certain decisions. It is
the courts, rather than creditors or debtors, which must have this power. The
very foundation of the Rule of Law demands that one must not be judge in
one's own cause. So far, international public creditors have been judge, jury,

7

Enterprise Institute (Nov 26, 2001), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2001/112601.htm> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
Kunibert Raffer, The Present State of the Discussion on Restructuring Sovereign Debts: Which Spedfic
Sovereign Insolvency Procedure?, Paper presented at the 4th Inter-Regional Debt Management
Conference, Debt Management and Financial Analysis System, UN Conference on Trade and
Development (Nov 11, 2003), available online at <http://r0.unctad.org/dmfas/pdfs/raffer.pdf>
(visited Mar 27, 2005).

8

9

See id for a few similarities, such as verifying claims, which the International Monetary Fund
("IIiF") also considers useful.
Raffer, 18 World Development at 301 (cited in note 5). For sources focused more on legal issues,
see Kunibert Raffer, Internationakng US Chapter 9 Insolveny: Economic Probkms in Need of Legal
Conceptualization, in Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Erik M.G. Denters, and Paul J.I.M. de Waart, eds,
The Right to Development in InternationalLaw 397 (Martinus Nijhoff 1992). See also papers available
online at <http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Kunibert.Raffer> (visited Mar 27, 2005).

Vol 6No. 1

InternafionaliingUS MunicipalInsolveny

Rafter

experts, bailiff, and occasionally even the debtor's lawyer all in one, mocking the
very foundation of any legal system.
The SDRM would continue this malpractice, conferring judicial authority
on the IMF-both a creditor in its own right and an IFI that is dominated by a
creditor voting majority. The Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum
("SDDRF") is an IMF organ without authority to challenge the Executive
Board's decisions. The Board would, inter alia, decide on the adequacy of
member's policies and debt sustainability, thus presenting the plan and
determining debt reductions. Formally, the SDRM exempts all multilateral
claims; but lower sustainability levels, which mean higher losses for
discriminated creditors, protect the viability of multilateral debt service. Smaller
reductions might put it at risk. The IMF has an economic interest in "erring on
the safe side," by demanding relatively larger reductions from others to protect
itself. Legal exemptions do not affect economic logic-this legal right is only
enforceable if debtors have sufficient money. Higher losses of other creditors
make problem-free debt service to IFIs more likely. The IMF would decide in its
own cause.
Itself subject to the IMF Board's decision, the SDDRF would hold
substantial powers over private creditors and the debtor. It could recognize or
void any claim in full or in part. It could practically wipe out claims, which is the
ultimate authority over creditors.
My international version of Chapter 9 respects the foundation of the Rule
of Law: impartial decision making. As national courts in debtor or creditor
countries might not be totally beyond political influence, ° I propose
international arbitration. Following established international law practice, each
side (creditors and the debtor) nominates one or two persons, who in turn elect
one more person to achieve an odd number. While institutionalized, neutral
entities are technically feasible, ad hoc panels are preferable. Assuming that new
cases will be rare once the present backlog has been handled, any standing
institution would be severely underemployed. Also, arbitration panels established
by creditors and the debtor for each case might be more acceptable as parties
10
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have more say. Like the SDDRF, these panels could recognize or void individual
claims. This arrangement confers the same ultimate authority on them as the
SDDRF is to be granted, but not more. My transparent procedure protects bona
fide creditors.
I propose adapting the essential features, but not all of the specifics, of
domestic Chapter 9 to form the basis of international arbitration procedures.
Specific procedural decisions could be made by the panel on this basis when
needed. Eventually, a body of procedural rules-a kind of procedural common
law-would emerge from these decisions.
In strict analogy to domestic Chapter 9, the population affected by the
solution would have the right to be heard-a right exercised, of course, by
representation. Therefore I proposed: "[e]xactly like in Rule 2018, this could be
done by trade unions or employees' associations."" Furthermore, international
organizations, such as the United Nations International Children's Emergency
Fund ("UNICEF"), "Catholic NGOs, similar organizations of other creeds
(especially in countries with non-Christian majorities), NGOs without religious
background ... and-last but by no means least-grass-roots organizations of
the poor" would also qualify. 12 Rogoff and Zettelmeyer seriously misrepresent
this proposal: "trade unions, NGOs or churches could function as arbitrators
speaking on behalf of the citizens in the debtor countries."' 3 A right to be heard
does not make someone a panel member or a judge in national courts.
Rejected as utopian when first proposed, 4 participation officially became
part of the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative ("HIPC II").
Civil society is to participate in designing poverty reduction strategies.
Obviously, participation is possible; furthermore, one cannot keep people from
expressing their views. In Argentina, for instance, civil society "participated" in
the streets by banging pots. Formal representation seems a better way of voicing
opinions.
The arbitration panel could sit anywhere, including the debtor or
neighboring countries, which would make participation by organizations
representing the population easier. I have never demanded that it "be
headquartered in a neutral country that is neither an active international lender

11 Raffer, 18 World Development at 305 (cited in note 5).
12
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nor borrower."" Few such countries exist. This error probably stems from a
misinterpretation of the following passage: "The reason why no court, whether
located in a creditor or debtor country, should chair the procedures is selfevident: its impartiality is not guaranteed."' 6 This remark refers to courts of law,
not courts of arbitration. Language apart, the illustrating example of Allied Bank
Internationa/7 does definitely not involve a court of arbitration.
Filing for insolvency protection would trigger a stay. The panel must
endorse or reject this stay immediately upon being formed. It must reject the
debtor's demand if unfounded, denying this debtor any advantage from starting
the procedure. Initially, the IMF suggested that it should be given the right to
endorse the stay triggered by the debtor's demand for insolvency relief. It later
tried to assuage private sector resistance with several variants, including one
allowing litigation by dissenting creditors, but preventing any pecuniary
advantage by deducting any amount recovered by litigation from the sum such
creditors would finally be entitled to receive as a result of insolvency
proceedings. 8 Reduced to a nudum ius, the right to litigation would become
meaningless-in fact, a practical joke: "Assuming that this creditor would have
to pay his/her legal fees (s)he would be worse off than by not litigating."' 9
The panel should verify claims, just as domestic courts routinely do. This
proposal, 20 initially classified as impracticable and utopian by the IMF's staff, is
now part of Krueger's "new approach."'" This gives hope that basic legal
principles, such as checking whether those signing loan contracts on behalf of
debtors actually have the authority to do so, might eventually be applied to
developing countries.
While the SDRM confers more power on the IMF, arbitration panels
established by the parties would dramatically reduce the IMF's importance.
Unsurprisingly, the IMF has tried to argue against ad hoc panels. Starting from
the verification of claims, the IMF worries, "to be recognized for participation in
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decision-making... the selection of a panel would have to follow, not precede,
disputes arising from
the verification process. But then who would resolve
' 23
verification if there was [sic] no panel already in place?
The answer is simple: all registering creditors nominate their one or two
arbitrators, who speedily determine the recognition of claims. Recognized
creditors could either confirm nominees or replace them. In theory, replacement
could be necessary if so many claims are excluded that different arbitrators
would have been nominated. This, however, while possible, seems unlikely to
occur frequently. As creditors are known and organized, endorsing or replacing
could be done quickly. Creditors whose claims are dismissed are a party with the
same right as other creditors to nominate arbitrators to judge their case. There is
no reason why creditors whose claims are finally not recognized should not
enjoy the same legal protection as those whose claims are.
To back up its weak point, the IMF adds that creditors might each wish to
appoint their own arbitrators, thereby making the case unmanageable. This
"could distort the balance of power between the debtor- and creditor-selected
arbitrators."24 Echoing Rogoff's and Zettelmeyer's misperception, the IMF sees
nominees not as impartial arbitrators but as representing and defending group
interests. If so, anyone would, of course, demand their own "defenders" or
lawyers. Unsurprisingly, this problem never emerged whenever private creditors
and sovereigns agreed on arbitration. Compared with the IMF's SDDRF, where
everyone must accept the IMF's dictate, my proposal confers more rights on
both parties.
Sustainability would not be determined by the IMF, but would instead
emerge from transparent negotiations between creditors and the debtor, with
representatives of the affected population presenting their arguments. For
decades, overly optimistic IFI forecasts have inflicted damages on member
countries, rendering strategies based on such forecasts-especially proposed
debt reductions-useless.2" Debt sustainability analysis highlights the inefficiency
of IFI programs. Levels of sustainability emerging from this process can be
expected to be better and more appropriate because all data and arguments can
be presented.

23
24
25

Id.
Id.
IMF and International Development Association, Debt Sustainabiiv in Low-Income
Proposal for an Operational Framework and Pohy Implications 13 (2004), available
<www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sustain/2004/020304.pdf> (visited Mar 27, 2005)
projected GDP growth in dollar terms that was overly optimistic of "almost 5
points a year").
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Arbitrators would mediate between debtors and creditors, chair and
support negotiations with advice, provide adequate possibilities to exercise the
right to be heard, and, if necessary, decide the matter. As all facts would be
presented by both parties and the representatives of the population during a
transparent procedure, decisions would be unlikely to affect substantial sums of
money, but would rather resolve deadlocks. Agreements between debtor and
creditors would need the panel's confirmation, in analogy to Section 943.26

III. CHAPTER 9
Initially not mentioning any specific Chapter, Krueger favors Chapter 11,
the very model that the IMF staff had attacked as unsuitable for sovereigns.
Krueger2 7 briefly refers once to Chapter 9 as being "[i]n many respects . .. of
greater relevance in the sovereign context because it applies to an entity that
carries out governmental functions."2 8 Pointing out differences from the
corporate model, she resumes: "All of these features could be appropriately
integrated into a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism."29 Important
differences between municipalities and sovereigns, however, would have
implications on the SDRM's design:
Chapter 9 legislation acknowledges-and does not impair-the power of
the state within which the municipality exists to continue to control the
exercise of the powers of the municipality, including expenditures. This lack
of independence of municipalities is one of the reasons why many countries
have not adopted insolvency legislation 30to address problems of financial
distress confronted by local governments.
This must be doubted on historical grounds. European governments seem
to operate on the doubtful premise that public authority cannot go bankrupt,
which makes special proceedings unnecessary. The point that municipalities are
subject to control by states is presented in a misleading way. It seems that
Krueger's point is based on 11 USC § 903, entitled "Reservation of State power
to control municipalities":
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by
legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of
the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including
expenditures for such exercise, but-

26

11 USC § 943.

27

Anne 0. Krueger, A New Approach to Soverzgn Debt Restructuring (IMF 2002), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/index.htm> (visited Mar 27, 2005).

29

Id at 12-13.
Id at 13.

30

Id at 14.

28

Summer 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such
(1)
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such
composition; and
(2) a judgement entered under su9 a law may not bind a creditor that does
not consent to such composition.
32
Given the need to reconcile the constitutional rights of Union and State,
Section 903 simply states the obvious: that insolvency procedures cannot
invalidate state laws, nor state rights regarding a "political subdivision or public
agency or instrumentality of a State" 33 deriving all its rights and powers from the
state. Filing for bankruptcy does not void the Constitution or the law. Section
903 does not disturb constitutional arrangements. 34 As laws on the subject of
bankruptcy are constitutionally reserved to Congress, 35 and as states are
prohibited to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, 36 states may only
suggest methods of composition. If creditors agreed, then this might be useful.
As the US Constitution does not apply elsewhere, US constitutional concerns
might not explain the lack of municipal insolvency laws in other countries. Only
post-communist Hungary adopted an insolvency law for public debtors upon
the advice of private Western consultants.
Both corporations and municipalities are subject to national laws. If
justified, Krueger's reservation would therefore also hold against Chapter 11.
Because national laws typically address nonsovereign actors, they could not be a
source for international norms if Krueger were right. International treaties could
not draw on the principles of national contractual laws that address
nonsovereigns. In contrast to this view, national legal norms have always been
considered a source for international law. Krueger's short, and only, passage on
municipal insolvency expresses an implicit dislike of Chapter 9.37 It is discussed
so cursorily that neither legal sources nor academic literature on this topic is
referred to. Chapter 9's transparent, fair, and democratic nature is at odds with
IMF perceptions.
Chapter 9 is the only insolvency procedure protecting governmental
powers, which renders it applicable to sovereigns. Section 904, "Limitation on
Jurisdiction and Powers of Court," states:

32

11 USC § 903.
See David S. Kupetz, MuniiipalDebt Adjustment under the Bankruptcy Code, 27 Urban L 531, 532, 581
(1995).

33

11 USC

34

See Kupetz, 27 Urban L at 582 (cited in note 32).

35
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US Const, art I, § 8, c 4.
Id, art 1,§ 10, cl 1.

37

Krueger, A New Approach at 12-13 (cited in note 6).

31
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Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the

plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the
case or otherwise, interfere with(1) any of the political and governmental powers of the debtor
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
38
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
The concept of sovereignty does not contain anything more than what
Section 904 protects. The court's jurisdiction depends on the municipality's
volition, beyond which it cannot be extended, similar to the jurisdiction of
international arbitrators. Unlike in other bankruptcy procedures, liquidation of
the debtor or receivership is not possible. A trustee may not be appointed.39
Section 902(5) explicitly confirms, "'trustee', when used in a section that is made
applicable in a case under this chapter . . . means debtor."4 ° Changes of
"management" (for example, the removal of elected officials) by courts or
creditors is impossible, and the same should hold for sovereign debtors. Only
voters should have the power to remove elected politicians from office. If any
regulatory or electoral approvals are necessary under other, nonbankruptcy laws
for the execution of the provisions of the plan, Section 943(b)(6) mandates that
1
such approval must be obtained before the court can confirm the plan 4 -a
point clearly adaptable to sovereigns. Similar provisions suitable for public
entities are neither needed nor applicable within Chapter 11.
Public interest in the functioning of public debtors safeguards a minimum
of municipal activities. US municipalities are allowed to maintain such basic
social services that are essential to the health, safety, and welfare of their
inhabitants. The affected population has a right to be heard. The procedure is as
transparent as befits a public entity. US Chapter 9 provides viable solutions
protecting the debtor's governmental sphere as well as the best interests of
creditors. This is essential, for only a totally fair mechanism would be universally
accepted, and rightly so.

38

11 USC 5 904.

39
40

But see 11 USC § 926. "Avoiding powers," if considered an exception, is very special and
justified.
11 USC § 902(5).

41

11 USC § 943(b)(6).
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IV. DEBTOR PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
ESSENCE OF INSOLVENCY
Impartial decisionmaking and debtor protection are the two essential
features of insolvency, both denied to the globe's poorest over decades. The
basic function of any insolvency procedure is the resolution of a conflict
between two fundamental legal principles: the right of creditors to interest and
repayments versus the generally recognized principle, limited not just to lending,
that no one should be forced to fulfil a contract if it leads to inhumane distress,
endangers one's life or health, or violates human dignity. Debtors should not be
forced to starve themselves or their children to be able to pay.
Although claims are recognised as legitimate and legal, insolvency exempts
resources from being seized by bona fide creditors. Debtors' human rights and
human dignity enjoy unconditional priority. Developing countries-more
precisely, their inhabitants-are the only exception from this humane paradigm,
because they are denied insolvency protection without any good economic or
legal reason. One must recall that insolvency only deals with claims based on
solid and proper legal foundations. Nevertheless, human dignity always takes
preference over perfectly legal, morally sound, and legitimate claims.
Developing countries are the only debtors fully and absolutely at the mercy
of (public) creditors even though debtor protection mechanisms could easily be
implemented. People remain unprotected against policies that extract larger
payments at severe cost to vulnerable groups, resulting in preventable harm such
as increased rates of infant mortality. Over decades public creditors have forced
these debtors to make sacrifices "which would not be acceptable in Canada and
the United States., 42 Even during the era of debt slavery creditors could not
simply grab and enslave insolvent debtors. The decision of a court was needed.
Nowadays, sovereign debtors and their people do not even enjoy this flimsy
legal protection: creditors can decide without needing any court's approval.
Creditors decide arbitrarily, with little economic success, as decades of "debt
management" prove.
Exempting resources under the title of debtor protection can only be
justified if they are used as intended. Concerns about the proper use of resources43
are not unfounded. But the solution is simple: a transparently managed fund
42

Interview by John Newark with John K. Galbraith, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
(1990), transcript available online at <http://aurora.icaap.org/talks/galbraith.htm> (visited Mar
27, 2004).

43

Ann Pettifor, Concordatsfor Debt Cancellation: Making Debt Relief Work Twice-First, as Money to the
Poor; Second, For Empowering the Poor, New Economics Foundation, Jubilee Research Ojune 2001),
available
online
at
<http://www.jubileeplus.Org/opinion/Ann-concordatsdebtcancellation.htm> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
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financed by the debtor in domestic currency. Within my model it would
statutorily have to use its resources for antipoverty measures and financing a
fresh start of the debtor economy. The management of such funds could be
monitored by international boards or advisory councils consisting of members
nominated by debtors, creditors, and NGOs. As this fund is a legal entity of its
own, checks and discussions of its projects would not concern the government's
budget, which is an important part of a country's sovereignty. Aid could be
channeled through the fund, changing its character of money set apart from the
ordinary budget towards a normal fund for the poor.
In analogy to domestic Chapter 9 this fund would finance basic social
services essential to the health, safety, and welfare of inhabitants. While this idea
had been severely attacked when first presented as part of a sovereign Chapter
9,"4 HIPC II officially incorporates antipoverty measures. Although actual
positive pro-poor effects lag perceptibly behind official declarations, the
principle is accepted. Once again, the SDRM rolls progress back.
V. APPLYING FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO IFIs:
TREATING ALL CREDITORS EQUALLY
Insolvency laws usually include preferential treatment of certain types of
claims. Treating all creditors equally is not a procedural necessity. This important
feature of my sovereign insolvency model is based on specific economic and
legal reasons; on the necessity to establish the equivalent of national liability and
tort laws; on jurisprudence as the ars boni et aequi; and on fairness to other
creditors, who like debtors have to pick up part of the bill of IFI failures. As the
so-called Brady Initiatives that reduced private sector claims for some MiddleIncome Countries showed, even generous reductions by one class of creditors
alone are insufficient to regain viability. The losses private creditors had to
accept have not benefited debtors under the present system of unjustifiable IFI
privileges.
At present, IFIs are not preferred creditors, as one can even read on their
own homepages, 4' but they do enjoy de facto privileges. The SDRM would
legalize this practice, changing present legal status and statutes of IFIs in their
favor. The IMF has never mentioned this change. Surreptitiously, the SDRM
would secure for the IMF the coveted legally preferred creditor status it lacks.

44

See Raffer, Internafional Debts: A Crisis for Whom? at 59 (cited in note 5); Raffer, 18 World
Development at 305-06 (cited in note 5).

45

See, for example, James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The InternationalMonetary Fund 1979-1989,
ch 16 (IMF 2001), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/
2001 /chl 6.pdf> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
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Checks of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("IBRD"), by, among others, Canada's Auditor General, concluded that it had
no preferred status. Under pressure from private business, it even waived the
negative pledge clause in its loans in 1993.46 If the IBRD had de jure preference,
there would have been neither the need for such clause, nor for pressure to
waive it.
Rather than stipulating any preference, the IBRD's Articles of Agreement
contain the legal obligation to grant debt relief if and when needed. Article IV,
section 6 obliges it to build up a special reserve 47 providing for what article IV,
section 7, "Methods of Meeting Liabilities of the Bank in Case of Defaults,"
demands.48 Detailed rules are stipulated how to proceed. As the IBRD is only
allowed to lend to members or with repayment fully guaranteed by member
states, 49 this logically applies to sovereign default.
All multilateral development banks mirror the IBRD's statutes. 50 Unlike
private creditors, they all are statutorily obliged to reduce debts in case of
default, but in practice they prefer to breach their statutes and not to grant debt
relief.5 1 This is done both to the detriment of debtor member states and of other
creditors, who have to accept much larger haircuts than legally necessary. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development writes off losses and
submits to arbitration in the way also foreseen for the IBRD. Obviously,
multilateral development banks, if properly managed, can survive obeying their
statutes. The IMF's economic interest in legalizing the present unlawful
discrimination of other creditors is immediately clear. It is one of the SDRM's
elements that make it an extremely self-serving proposal.
Although loudly and wrongly asserting preferred creditor status and their
incapability of reducing claims, the IMF and all multilateral development banks
have built up large loan loss provisions. Based on a 2002 decision to reach SDR
10 billion, the IMF's "precautionary balances" had risen to about SDR 6 billion
(8.5 percent of credit outstanding) as of the end of October 2003. Other IFIs'
provisions ranged from slightly above 20 percent (IBRD) to over 30 percent
46

Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations 323 (Pan 1998).

47

48

The World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"),
IBRD Aricles of Agreement, art IV, § 6, available online at <http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049557-menuPK:63000601 -page
PK:34542-piPK:36600-theSitePK:29708,00.html> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
Id, art IV, 6.

49

Id, art III,

50

4.
See Kunibert Raffer, InternationalFinancial Institutions and FinandalAccountabiliy, 18 Ethics & Ind

51

Aff 61 (2004), available online at <http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/
prmlD/5019> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
Id at 67-68.

Vol. 6 No. 1

InternationalizingUS Muniipal nsolveny

Raffer

(Asian Development Bank).5 2 All have charged their clients the costs of losses
but refuse to grant reductions, claiming that they cannot finance this already
prefmanced relief.
Finally, the SDRM would undo progress achieved under the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative ("HIPC"), which broke the taboo of
multilateral debt reductions-a great merit of James Wolfensohn. Although still
unduly preferred, IFIs are not exempt under HIPC-unlike under the SDRM.
Overwhelming evidence, even by IFIs themselves, shows that IFIs force
policies on debtors5 3 thus taking far-reaching decisions. Equal treatment would
expose them appropriately to the risks involved, while preference for IFIs would
be inequitable and unfair. However, even if IFIs only provided consultancy
services like other consultants, there is no reason why the liability and financial
accountability standards of consultants should not apply. IFIs do not deny that
they give advice as part and parcel of services paid for by clients. The IBRD
even calls itself the knowledge bank.
If consultants fail to respect professional standards or to work properly,
they can be taken to court. If governments or their agents create damage by
negligence, by failing to exercise their duty of care, by not obeying professional
standards or acting unlawfully, governments can be sued by individuals. As a
general principle, victims have a right to compensation. IFIs, however, can
inflict damage with impunity, and doing so may even allow them financial gain.
Developing countries and the poor remain unprotected against negligent or
willful damage. Worse still, errors and negligent damage tend to increase the
importance and income of IFs. Damages caused by one negligent project or
adjustment program call for a new loan to repair them, thus multiplying IFI
income-"IFI-flops securing IFI-jobs." 54 Institutions such as the IMF are
economically rewarded for not applying due diligence. Such perverse outcomes
are economically unjustifiable, mocking the understanding of law as ars boni et
aequi.
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Joseph Stiglitz heard about an incident that illustrates the break from
normal legal practice: an IMF country team had copied large parts of the text for
one country's report into another country's report, even leaving the original
country's name in a few places.55 Jurists would hardly doubt how to classify the
behavior of consultants selling an analysis of corporation A's problems to
corporation B after changing names, making B believe that it was receiving
tailor-made advice for its problems.
Two more examples may suffice to demonstrate the difference between
private market actors and IFIs. In 2003, a German court ordered a bank to
compensate a client whom it had advised to buy Argentine bonds as high
yielding yet safe investments.5 6 The court followed the plaintiff's argument that
the bank did not explain Argentina's well-known difficulties adequately, ordering
the bank fully to indemnify the client because of its advice. A British couple
borrowing money from Lloyds successfully sued the bank because its manager
had advised and encouraged them to renovate and sell a house at a profit. The
High Court ruled that as the manager had gone beyond mere lending by giving
specific advice, he should have clearly pointed out risks and advised the couple
against the project. Lloyds had to pay damages when prices in the property
market fell and the couple suffered a loss.57 The point is not whether courts
found in favor of plaintiffs or defendants, but that legal redress is possible.
Indeed, the principle is firmly established in all OECD countries that anyone
suffering or alleging to suffer damage due to another's fault or because of
failures to observe a purely equitable duty must be able to seek redress.
No multilateral debt problem would exist if normal accountability, liability
standards, and tort laws applied to Southern debtors. But IFI clients have to pay
for their consultants' negligence, which increases unpayable debts. The
establishment of the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office ("IEO") or the
IBRD's Inspection Panel, are commendable steps in the right direction, but they
do not change the underlying problem. While officially recognizing fault, they do
not provide real relief: they do not provide financial redress. Simply thumbing
through their internal publications provides many examples of unmet due
diligence.
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The IEO's evaluation of the IMF's role in Argentina uncovered many clear
cases of, at best, grave negligence.58 The September 2001 "program was also
based on policies that were either known to be counterproductive . . . or that
had proved to be 'ineffective and unsustainable everywhere they had been
tried."' 5 9 The IEO's critique is further damning because it is based not on perfect
hindsight but rather on views "expressed by FAD [the IMF's Fiscal Affairs
Department] at the time."60 Another "critical error" was the lack of "a clearer
' 61
understanding of an exit strategy in case the chosen strategy did not work.
The Board supported "a program that Directors viewed as deeply flawed"
mainly because "no one has proposed a different strategy that, risk adjusted,
promises a less costly alternative., 62 The " . . . September 2001 augmentation
suffered from a number of weaknesses in program design, which were evident at
the time. If the debt were indeed unsustainable, as by then well recognized by
IMF staff, the program offered no solution to that problem. ' 63 The IMF "failed
to use the best analytical tools, ' 64 and "[a]vailable analytical tools were not used
to explore potential vulnerabilities in sufficient depth., 65 The IMF was
consistently unduly "optimistic" in its forecasts, as this and other reports
document. 66 This small choice may suffice to show that if the IMF were a
consultancy firm and Argentina were its client, Argentina would easily win
damage compensation. But the IMF is not a consultant. Argentina has to pay for
programs the IMF implemented, knowing according to the IEO that these very
programs contributed to her ruin. The IMF gets more interest income from a
damaged Argentina than if it had successfully intervened and solved Argentina's
problems. One cannot help but concur with the statement of the Argentine
Governor: "Recognizing errors is, however, just the first step in a healthy selfcriticism exercise. The second step is bearing responsibility for failures, namely
sharing the burden of redressing their consequences. 67
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Internal evaluations of other cases found the same problems. A small
68
choice of formulations may suffice to prove this: "excessively optimistic,
"failure to take account of the key factors, ' 69 "risks that were not sufficiently
explored," "available data were not adequately utilized,"70 "structural
weaknesses" whose "seriousness" was not "fully analyzed or stressed in
surveillance reports,"'" not informing clients about dangers the IMF had
recognized, 72 "overpromising
what the IMF can deliver, ' 73 or the need for
' 74
"greaterresults orientation.
The IEO is frequently quite explicit when it comes to IMF failures. Its
analysis of Asia nevertheless fails to mention that at least one official IFI
document explicitly warned that liberalizing capital accounts would lead to
catastrophe in Asia. In 1999, the IBRD acknowledged having known "the75
1990s.
early
the
since
lessons"
institutional
relevant
An audit report by its Operations Evaluation Department on Chile's experience
with precipitate capital account liberalization warned expressly that proper
sequencing and institution building were mandatory to avoid damage. The risks
of quick capital account liberalization had been recognized years before the
crash, and the unfolding of the Asian crisis when these countries liberalized in
the Chilean way could be watched like a movie whose script is known. But
instead of pointing out these risks and warning Asian countries, IFIs encouraged
their Asian members to carry on policies leading them straight into a crash.
Equal treatment of all creditors would be a first, yet important step 76 to
create disincentives for such behavior and to overcome the present victim-pays,
guilty-party-gains principle. In the light of the IEO's findings, one may even
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argue that it is too soft on IFIs and that other creditors should enjoy preference
over IFIs. The SDRM attempts to bar even equal treatment, and to preserve the
present legally, morally, and economically perverted arrangement.
VI. STABILIZING INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
I have repeatedly advocated optional features for eliminating legal risk and
stabilizing markets, especially focusing on provisioning. 7 Eliminating avoidable
problems is advantageous to both creditors and debtors.
Because continental European banks had appropriate loan loss provisions,
they were much less affected by the 1982 crisis than US and Japanese banks. Tax
deductible loan loss provisioning had encouraged the former to recognize
economic reality. Sufficient provisions would have allowed them to realize losses
immediately if needed, while US banks had claims vis-A-vis some large countries
so high that losses might have wiped out their equity.
Tax deductible provisions have often been misunderstood as a taxpayers'
subsidy. Costs to taxpayers, and hence the benefits to banks, or other creditors
(such as corporations outside the financial sector), have always been strongly
exaggerated. 8
Loans still kept at 100 percent on the books have lower factual or real
values once creditworthiness and economic standing of debtors have become
doubtful, as the existence of secondary markets proves. From an economic and
factual point of view money is actually lost before nominal claims are eventually
adjusted downwards in the books. Recognizing diminished values of claims is
just another way of stating that the sum of net assets, and thus the tax base, has
declined. Reducing claims immediately to secondary market values would make
this absolutely clear, but is patently unfeasible. Not least, it would encourage
debtors not to honor their obligations in full.
To the extent that provisions reflect actual losses in the values of loans
already suffered but not yet booked, they do not economically constitute taxable
income. This would be the case if loan loss reserves set aside during one year are
equivalent to the change in factual values during that year. Increasing reserves
continuously in line with declining factual values would thus not really cost
taxpayers a single cent. Should the economic outlook of the debtor improve,
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these reserves would, of course, have to be reduced accordingly to keep
provisions in line with actual losses. A tax regime without tax deductibility of
reserves taxes illusory profits existing only because of tax laws. The Treasury
gets an interest-free loan as losses are shifted to the future. An economist can
only wonder why banks in jurisdictions restricting or refusing tax deductibility
have not protested against paying too much tax.
Because the real world is not an economist's comfortable blackboard,
uncertainty will not allow a precise estimate of probabilities (and thus factual
values) in practice. One may discuss whether reserves actually match losses
already suffered. If reserves are larger banks get a loan by tax authorities
equivalent to this difference between reserves and changes in the values of loans;
if reserves are smaller this difference is taxed as illusory income. The respective
amounts are:
$[100(1 - p) - reserves]tig
where
p

repayment probability, hence

100p

expected value,

t
ig

=

tax rate
interest rate at which the Treasury itself borrows.

The first term in square brackets expresses actual losses. If set aside
reserves are smaller than actual losses, the term in square brackets is simply
illusory income taxed. If reserves are larger, this would be a temporary loan from
the Treasury, which carries no interest in many countries. Such a loan would
mean costs to taxpayers that are this difference times tig. At t = 40 percent and ig
= 4 percent, a difference of $100 would result in costs of $1.60 per year.
Assuming that supervisory authorities keep loan loss reserves roughly in line
with the decline in value of dubious loans, both costs to taxpayers and taxation
of illusory profits will be very low or negligible. A substantial stabilizing effect
can be obtained at no or minimal costs to taxpayers.
Economically, provisions have the important function of spreading losses
over some years-losses which might otherwise ruin creditors if they had to
absorb them in one year. Whether to have tax systems encouraging more
prudential provisioning should not be decided without considering the
alternatives. Continental Illinois or the case of the Savings and Loan institutions
(with bailout costs at least two-hundred billion dollars) may suffice to show that
extremely limited tax deductibility does not necessarily prevent costs to
taxpayers. Bailouts cost money too, on top of the costs of the crises.
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The introduction of my international Chapter 9 could be used to change
the tax regime regarding provisioning where needed. This would perceptibly
deescalate future debt crises, leaving creditors and debtors more leeway for
negotiating their way out of the problem. Economically, it would also be fair to
creditors.
VII. CONCLUSION
My proposal can be summarized very briefly: fundamental legal principles
recognized and applied within our countries must also be respected when
dealing with debtors from the South. Human rights, human dignity, and the
protection by the Rule of Law must be enjoyed equally by all human beings,
irrespective of passports. While the IMF's SDRM is marred by unacceptable
institutional self-interest rendering it inequitable and unfair to nearly anyone but
the IMF, especially to private creditors and debtors, an international Chapter 9
offers a fair and equitable solution, and is in the best interest of bona fide
creditors, debtor countries and the poor. Economic logic suggests that the IMF
will continue lobbying for its SDRM at the next opportunity. Anyone affected,
not least private creditors, would be well advised to explore alternatives to the
SDRM, such as my proposal, that are fair to them.
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